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Casenote
Property Damage Caused by Defective
Products: Strict Tort Recovery
Hawkins Construction Co. v. Matthews Co.,
190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
The law itself is none too clear and I am doing the best I can to
explain it as I understand it from the cases that have been handed
down.'
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Kohler v. Ford Motor Co. 2
held that a manufacturer was strictly liable in tort when an
article he placed in the market had a defect causing an injury to
a human being rightfully using that product.3 This very restrictive
statement of the strict tort theory left open the question of whether
in Nebraska the doctrine would be extended to allow recovery for
damage to property. The Restatement (Second) of Torts section
402A (hereinafter referred to as "section 402A" or the "Restate-
ment") explicitly provides that a plaintiff may recover in strict tort
for physical harm to his property.4 Many cases from jurisdictions
1. Macres v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Mich. 567, 570, 287 N.W. 922,
923 (1939) (Buchnell, J., quoting the trial judge).
2. 187 Neb. 428, 191 N.W.2d 601 (1971).
3. Id. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 606.
4. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) provides:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition un-
reasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his prop-
erty is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused
to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a
product, and(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer
without substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the prepara-
tion and sale of his product, and(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from
or entered into any contractual relation with the seller,
(Emphasis added).
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other than Nebraska have held in accord with the Restatement."
The Nebraska Supreme Court in Hawkins Construction Co. v. Mat-
thews Co.6 addressed this important question that had been left un-
answered in Kohler.7 The majority opinion in Hawkins subdivided
property damage cases into two categories-cases where the defec-
tive product causes damage to itself and cases where the defective
product causes damage to other property.8 It is clear from Hawkins
that in Nebraska damage to the defective product itself is not re-
coverable in strict tort. Recovery on such claims is to be governed
exclusively by the warranty provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code (hereinafter referred to as the "UCC" or the "Code").9 Wheth-
er strict tort recovery for damage to other property is permitted de-
pends on which of two alternative interpretations Hawkins is given.
This casenote will analyze the court's effort to determine the appli-
cability of strict tort theories to property damage claims.1°
I.
The factual setting in Hawkins is complex, but a simplified ver-
sion will facilitate discussion of the legal issues in the case. Scaf-
fold equipment was manufactured by defendant Waco Scaffold and
Shoring Company ("Waco") and leased to plaintiff Hawkins Con-
struction Company ("Hawkins") by defendant Matthews Company
("Matthews"). Before leasing the equipment, Hawkins received
advertising brochures published by Waco and stamped with the
5. See, e.g., Arrow Transportation Co. v. Fruehauf Corp., 289 F. Supp.
170 (D. Ore. 1968); Lee v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 262 F. Supp. 232
(D. Tenm. 1966); Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145,
45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965); Brewer v. Reliable Automotive Co., 240 Cal.
App. 2d 173, 49 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1966); State Store Mfg. Co. v. Hodges,
189 So. 2d 113 '(Miss. 1966); Rosenau v. City of New Brunswick, 51
N.J. 130, 238 A.2d 169 (1968); O.M. Franklin Serum Co. v. C.A. Hoover
& Son, 418 S.W.2d 482 (Tex. 1967); Monsanto Co. v. Thrasher, 463
S.W.2d 25 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970). In view of the subsequent confusion
created by Hawkins, an interesting case is Norfolk Develop. Corp. v.
St. Regis Pulp & Paper Corp., 338 F. Supp. 1213 (D. Neb. 1972), which
applied strict tort liability to property damage.
6. 190 Neb. 546, 209 N.W.2d 643 (1973).
7. "We are faced squarely with the proposition of the extension of a
doctrine beyond personal injuries to permit recovery for all property
damage." Id. at 559, 209 N.W.2d at 652.
8. Id. at 560, 209 N.W.2d at 652.
9. Id. at 562, 209 N.W.2d at 653.
10. The Hawkins opinion is also concerned with the creation of express
warranties by advertising, id. at 564-65, 209 N.W.2d at 654; contributory
negligence, id. at 566-67, 209 N.W.2d at 655-56; and liability of lessors
in a strict tort action, id. at 565-66, 209 N.W.2d at 655. This casenote
will not consider these other areas.
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name and address of Matthews. The brochures, according to the
court, expressly warranted the scaffold equipment's load capacity.:"
The parties consulted extensively about the use of the equipment
and Waco submitted drawings showing the recommended scaffold
configuration.
Hawkins used the scaffold equipment to support a roof deck
cement pour at a construction site. On the day of the accident,
workmen on a portion of the deck were pouring cement. During
the pour, the roof deck supported by Waco's scaffold collapsed.' 2
There were no personal injuries. Hawkins sued for the cost of
rebuilding the damaged structure, and other expenses, as well as re-
placement of the allegedly defective scaffold. 13
II.
The principal trial issues were whether the scaffold was defec-
tive, and, if so, whether the defect proximately caused the accident.
The trial court submitted the case to the jury under the theories of
11. Id. at 549, 209 N.W.2d at 646-47.
12. Erection of the shoring equipment necessitated stacking several
scaffold panels in order to reach the proper height. To accomplish
this task, defendants furnished tubular connectors, manufactured by
Waco. Several broken connectors were discovered at the accident
scene, and Hawkins contended that the failure of these connectors
was the proximate cause of the accident. Waco denied that the con-
nectors were defective. In addition, Waco offered, as an affirmative
defense, that plaintiff had not complied with the specifications fur-
nished by Waco; and that such failure to comply was the cause of the
collapse. Id. at 553, 209 N.W.2d at 648-49.
13. Hawkins sought recovery for the following itemized expenses:
Formwork and Shoring Lumber $5,667.97
Concrete 2,120.44
Reinforcing Steel 1,880.20
Replace Finishing Machines 800.00
Collapse Photos 118.49
Mechanical Work 328.19
Electrical Work 836.06
Scaffold Replacement and Freight 9,147.39
Equipment Rental 2,312.80
Hawkins Labor 4,803.53
Insurance and Taxes 696.51
Estimate-Work To Be Done, Haul
Away Debris, Masonry 727.95
Delay Costs-Heating, Utilities,
Supervision, Watchman 1,150.00
$30,589.53
5% Overhead 1,529.48
Record at 3. It is important to note that the first four items above
involved damage to property other than the defective scaffold equip-
ment, while the remaining items are for damage to the scaffold and
economic loss claims.
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express warranty and strict liability in tort.' 4 The jury returned
a general verdict for Hawkins and the defendants appealed. On
review, the supreme court held the trial court erred in submitting
the issue of strict tort liability to the jury. Because the verdict
was general there was no way to determine whether the jury
resolved the case upon strict tort liability or express warranty. How-
ever, the court held that the instructions on strict tort liability did
not constitute prejudicial error. The only jury issues-whether the
product was defective and whether the defect proximately caused
the damage-were identical to both theories of recovery. The jury's
verdict would have been for the plaintiff under either strict tort
or express warranty; therefore, the trial court was affirmed.' 5
This was the holding of the Hawkins case. No further elabora-
tion was necessary to affirm the trial court's judgment. However,
Chief Justice White, writing for the majority, explained why the
issue of strict tort liability should not have been submitted to the
jury. He undertook to determine "the proper range of strict tort
liability"' 6 in Nebraska by addressing the question left open in
Kohler-the extension of the strict tort doctrine beyond personal
injuries to permit recovery for property damage.
The majority opinion in Hawkins first subdivided property dam-
age claims into two categories: "Situations where the defective
product causes damage to itself and situations where the defective
product causes damage to other property."' 7 Hawkins indicated that
strict tort liability is not to be extended to both categories of prop-
erty damage claims:
We perceive no sound reason for extending the doctrine of strict
tort liability to the point where it emasculates the law of sales and
the Uniform Commercial Code, and extended to situations in which
the loss involves injury to the defective product itself.'8
The chief justice reasoned that
[t]he doctrine of strict tort liability was not conceived as a substi-
tute for warranty liability in cases where the purchaser has only
lost the benefit of his bargain .... If the loss is merely economic,
the Uniform Commercial Code has given the purchaser an ample
recourse under the particular provisions and requirements of the
code.' 9
Where damage is confined to the defective product itself, a plain-
tiff must seek recovery under the UCC's warranty provisions.
14. 190 Neb. at 559, 209 N.W.2d at 651.
15. Id. at 563, 209 N.W.2d at 653-54.
16. Id. at 559, 209 N.W.2d at 652.
17. Id. at 560, 209 N.W.2d at 652.
18. Id. at 562, 209 N.W.2d at 653.
19. Id. at 561-62, 209 N.W.2d at 653.
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Strict liability may be available, however, when the defective prod-
uct damages other property. The majority opinion in several
places is careful to distinguish between damage to the product itself
and damage to other property. The UCC is "designed to apply,"
according to the majority opinion, "where the product is defective
but where no damage results from the defect, either to persons or
other property."20 The interpretation of Hawkins that seems to be
dictated by the majority opinion's reasoning is that recovery would
be available in strict tort when persons or property other than the
defective product itself are damaged.
The obvious inconsistency between the holding in Hawkins-i.e.,
that the trial court erred in submitting the issue of strict tort liabil-
ity to the jury-and the majority opinion's reasoning is that the de-
fective product did cause damage to "other property."'21 This incon-
sistency suggests an alternative interpretation of Hawkins. The
case may be interpreted to exclude recovery in strict tort for any
type of property damage claim.
The second interpretation of Hawkins is supported by Judge
Clinton's concurring opinion. Judge Clinton indicated that he
read the majority opinion as declining to extend strict liability in
tort beyond allowing recovery for personal injury.22 He stated
that the majority opinion should have elaborated this rationale. 23
20. Id. at 561, 209 N.W.2d at 652 (emphasis added).
21. See note 13 supra. Although the majority apparently failed to apply
its own rationale, there are two possible explanations which might
reconcile the majority's language with the facts of the case. First, it
could be argued that until the cement attained sufficient rigidity to
stand alone, the structure was merely an extension of the scaffold
which supported it, and thus a part of the defective product itself.
Second, the majority may have felt that, taken as a whole, it was more
appropriate to decide Hawkins under contract than tort principles.
Hawkins was a professional builder unlikely to be confused by the
Code's notice and warranty provisions. It probably was insured for
the loss or it could pass the cost on to the ultimate purchaser. Many
of Hawkins' claims, such as delay costs and labor, were clearly
economic. Tort recovery traditionally is applied where plaintiff is
confronted with an unexpected risk. Hawkins, Waco and Matthews
collaborated extensively about the use of the shoring equipment. The
product expressly was warranted to meet plaintiff's needs and the
loss involved was a dickered aspect of the bargain.
22. 190 Neb. at 570, 209 N.W.2d at 657.
23. Id. Judge Clinton gave three reasons for not extending strict tort
liability to property damage cases. First, such extension conflicts
with property damage sections of the UCC (NEB. UCC §§ 2-715 (2) (b),
2-719(3) ) and allowing strict tort recovery in this area would repeal
by judicial fiat the UCC provisions pertaining to exclusion and
modification of warranties, limitation of damages and modification
and limitation of remedies (NEB. UCC §§ 2-316, 2-718, 2-719). Id. at
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Judge McCown's dissent pointed out the inconsistency between
the majority opinion's reasoning and the holding of the case. While
he agreed 'that damages for commercial loss should be governed
by the UCC, Judge McCown objected to classifying the damages in
Hawkins as commercial. 24 Strict tort recovery should have been
allowed, according to Judge McCown, because the entire damage
was in the form of "physical harm" to Hawkins' property.25 Judge
McCown urged the court to adopt the Restatement's "physical harm"
test.
28
In an unreported decision, subsequent to Hawkins, Judge Urbom
of the United States District Court for the District of Nebraska
refused to submit the issue of strict tort liability to the jury where a
defective product caused damage to property other than the de-
fective product.27 This decision supports Judge Clinton's inter-
pretation of Hawkins that strict tort liability does not allow re-
covery for any property damage.
II.
Because Hawkin's discussion of the proper line of demarcation
571, 209 N.W.2d at 657-58. Clinton explained that strict tort recovery
for personal injuries is allowed, despite corresponding UCC pro-
visions, because of the case law antecedent to the Code and NEB. UCC
2-719(3) providing that limitation of consequential damages for per-
sonal injuries is prima facie unconscionable. Id. at 571-72, 209 N.W.2d
at 658. Second, damages of the type involved in Hawkins are ordi-
narily covered by insurance and there is no reason to use strict tort
liability to transfer the risk of loss from one insurer to another. Id.
at 572-73, 209 N.W.2d at 658-59. Third, important information relating
to policy in this area is inadequate. Id. at 573, 209 N.W.2d at 659.
24. 190 Neb. 568, 209 N.W.2d 656 (1973).
25. Id. at 569, 209 N.W.2d at 656-57.
26. Id. at 570, 209 N.W.2d at 657.
27. West Nebraska Express, Inc. v. United States Thermo Control Co.,
No. CV72-L 148 (D. Neb.). West Nebraska Express ("WNX"), an
interstate shipper, transported a load of beef for a shipper, Swift &
Co., from Scottsbluff, Neb., to Syracuse, N.Y. When the WNX unit
arrived in New York, due to an alleged defect in the refrigeration unit,
the meat was in an off condition. WNX was absolutely liable to Swift
under 49 U.S.C. § 20(11) (1970) which prescribes the liability of
carriers to shippers. WNX brought an action against the manufacturer
of the refrigeration unit for the damage to the beef. Judge Urbom
refused to instruct on strict tort liability:
Whether strict liability attaches under Nebraska law to dam-
age from a malfunctioning article to property other than the
defective product is not crystal clear, but I read Hawkins Con-
struction Company v. Matthews ... as saying that strict
liability does not attach, because the Uniform Commercial
Code provides a remedy for property damage both to the de-
fective article, and to other property.
Record at 81.
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between strict tort liability and the UCC's warranty provisions28 is
susceptible of two divergent interpretations, the case does not go
very far toward delimiting the appropriate scope of the two theories
of recovery. A hypothetical case is illustrative of the interrelation-
ship between these two bodies of law in products liability cases.
Suppose that a Buyer, B, purchased a new color television. One
evening while B was watching television, the set exploded. A bril-
liant flash caused by the explosion permanently damaged B's eyes
and destroyed the television and several pieces of furniture in B's
family room. The manufacturer had expressly warranted the set to
be free from material and workmanship defects. All other warran-
ties, express or implied, were disclaimed and the remedy was limited
to repair or replacement of the defective part, which was identified
as a $12 tube. Liability for consequential damages were expressly
denied.
Under Kohler, B could use a theory of strict tort liability to
recover for his personal injuries.29 He also could recover for his
personal injuries under the UCC. The Code provides for a recovery
of consequential damages for breach of express warranty.30 The
manufacturer's exclusion of consequential damages from injury
to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima facie uncon-
scionable. 31
28. For general discussions of this topic, see Dickerson, The ABC's of Pro-
ducts Liability-With a Close Look at Section 402A and the Code, 36
TENN. L. REV. 439 (1969); Rapson, Products Liability Under Parallel
Doctrines: Contrasts Between the Uniform Commercial Code and
Strict Liability in Tort, 19 RUTGERS L. REV. 692 (1965); Shanker, Strict
Tort Theory of Products Liability and the Uniform Commercial Code;
A Commentary on Jurisprudential Eclipses, Pigeonholes and Com-
munications Barriers, 17 W. RES. L. REV. 5 (1965); Speidel, Products
Liability Economic Loss and the UCC, 40 TENN. L. REV. 309 (1973);
Titus, Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 32 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970).
29. 187 Neb. at 436, 191 N.W.2d at 606.
30. NEs. UCC § 2-715(2):
Consequential damages resulting from the seller's breach
include(a) any loss resulting from general or particular require-
ments and needs of which the seller at the time of con-
tracting had reason to know and which could not reason-
ably be prevented by cover or otherwise; and(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting from
any breach of warranty.
31. NEB. UCC § 2-719 (3):
Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless
the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case
of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation
of damages where the loss is commercial is not.
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The real distinctions between the alternative interpretations
of Hawkins, section 402A and the UCC surface in B's property dam-
age claims against the manufacturer. -Under the UCC war-
ranty provisions, B's recovery technically is limited to repair or re-
placement of the $12 tube. It has been held, however, that such a
warranty implied the product was repairable. 32 The proper meas-
ure of damages would be the value of the television at the time of
its destruction. 33  It is proper under the Code to limit remedies
and to exclude liability for consequential damages resulting from
property damage; 34 therefore, B would not recover for the damage
to his furniture. The only arguments B could make in attempting
to defeat the manufacturer's disclaimers and exclusions are that
they are unconscionable 35 or that the remedy provided fails of its
essential purpose.36 In this hypothetical, however, these argu-
ments probably would be little assistance to B.37
32. In Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, 479 S.W.2d 211 (Mo. App. 1972),
plaintiff's new car was destroyed by fire started by a defective
electrical system. The manufacturer's express warranty provided
for repair or replacement of defective parts. The court held that
provision in the warranty to imply the car was repairable. It would
be ludicrous, the court reasoned, to require plaintiff to ask the de-
fendant to do the impossible.
33. Id. at 213.
34. NEB. UCC § 2-719(1) (a):
[T]he agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit
or alter the measure of damages recoverable under this Article,
as by limiting the buyer's remedies to return of the goods
and replacement of the price or to repair and replacement of
non-conforming goods or parts ....
35. NEB. UCC § 2-302 authorizes courts to refuse to enforce "unconscion-
able" contracts or portions thereof. However, Comment 1 to that
section states that the basis of unconscionability is "prevention of un-
fair surprise ... not disturbance of allocation of risks because of
superior bargaining power." See, e.g., K & C, Inc. v. Westinghouse
Elec. Corp., 437 Pa. 303, 263 A.2d 390 (1970).
36. NEB. UCC § 2-719(2) provides that "when circumstances cause an
exclusive or limited warranty to fail of its essential purpose, remedy
may be had as provided in this act."
37. Cases under UCC § 2-719 (2) have held that the purpose of the remedy
is not to make the buyer whole for damage caused by a defective
product; rather the purpose of the remedy is to make the product
work. If the buyer is not deprived of any of the remedies provided
by contract, the remedy has not failed of its essential purpose.
In Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972), the plaintiff's new car over an 18 month period was in the shop
some 45 days for 50 different defects. The warranty limited the
remedy to repair or replacement of defective parts. The plaintiff
admitted that in each instance diligent attempts were made to rectify
the defects, but on occasion it would take from one to five attempts
to make a repair. Plaintiff's argument that the remedy had failed
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If Hawkins is read to allow recovery in strict tort liability for
damage to property other than the defective product itself, B could
recover for the damage to the furniture. Apparently, however, B
could not recover for the damage to the television.A8 On the other
hand, if the majority opinion in Hawkins precludes recovery in
strict tort liability for any property damage, B has no cause of ac-
tion in strict tort theory. He has lost his television and the furni-
ture in the family room. His recovery, unless he is successful
against the manufacturer or dealer on a negligence or res ispa lo-
quitur theory, is perhaps only the replacement of a $12 tube and
at most the value of the television.
Section 402A would allow recovery for damage to the furniture
and the television because the damage was in the form of physical
harm.39
of its essential purpose was rejected because there had been no
repudiation of the warranty nor any wilful refusal or failure to make
the repair. In another case, Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d
388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970), the same remedy was held to have failed
of its essential purpose because the dealer was dilatory in making
repairs. The dealer allowed plaintiff's tractor to remain in his shop
for weeks at a time without working on it. For other cases dis-
cussing § 2-719(2), see V-M Corp. v. Bernard Distrib. Co., 447 F.2d
864 (7th Cir. 1971); Russo v. Hilltop Lincoln-Mercury, 479 S.W.2d 211
(Mo. App. 1972).
Under the foregoing analysis, B might be able to recover the value
of the television. Because it was totally destroyed, B was deprived
of the remedy provided by the contract.
38. B might seek recovery in strict tort by arguing that the defective
product be defined as the tube. If this definition of defective product
were accepted, it would mean the defective product did cause damage
to other property. This argument is discussed in Franklin, When
Worlds Collide: Liability Theories and Disclaimers in Defective-Pro-
duct Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 974, 982 (1966).
39. A leading case which most clearly reflects the Restatement position
is Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr.
17 (1965). In that case, defective brakes on a truck resulted in a
collision. The plaintiff, owner of the truck, sued the manufacturer
seeking damages for physical injury to the truck, restitution of the
purchase price and profits lost in his business because he was unable to
make normal use of the truck. Although the case was decided on
warranty grounds, Chief Justice Traynor "gratuitously" expounded
on the proper application of strict tort liability. The law of sales was
carefully articulated to govern the economic relations between
suppliers and consumers of goods, Traynor wrote, while the doctrine
of strict liability in tort was designed not to undermine the warranty
provisions but to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.
Chief Justice Traynor explicitly included physical injury to property
within the scope of strict tort liability:
Plaintiff contends that, even though the law of warranty gov-
erns the economic relations between the parties, the doctrine
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Conversely, there are situations where the Restatement rule is
inapplicable, but the warranty provisions of the UCC provide relief.
Suppose, for example, that B's television did not explode, but it
simply was a lemon. There is no recovery in strict tort liability
under either reading of Hawkins because there is no damage to any
property." Similarly, section 402A provides no recovery because
there has been no "physical harm" to B or his property.41 How-
ever, since this type of loss is covered by the manufacturer's ex-
press warranty, B can recover under the relevant provisions of
the UCC.42 Here the repair or replacement of defective parts is
the appropriate remedy, and in many cases it will satisfy B. This
is the economic or commercial loss case where B has lost the benefit
of his bargain.
This hypothetical demonstrates the many areas of overlap be-
tween strict tort liability and the Code's warranty provisions. The
Hawkins majority opinion appears to be based on the misconcep-
tion that no such overlap exists. In his quest to "determine the
proper range of strict tort liability," Chief Justice White repeatedly
explained that economic loss is properly governed by warranty; the
negative implication was that everything else belongs in the realm
of strict tort liability.43 Commercial losses are exclusively governed
by the UCC, but the negative implication is not true. Recovery
for personal injury is available under both strict tort and the UCC.
Where a defective product causes injury to other property, the UCC
of strict liability in tort should be extended to govern physical
injury to plaintiff's property, as well as personal injury. We
agree with this contention. Physical injury to property is so
akin to personal injury that there is no reason to distinguish
them.
Id. at 19, 403 P.2d at 152, 45 Cal. Rptr. at 24. For other cases
applying the physical harm test, see note 5 supra.
40. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
41. See note 4 supra. An extreme position which goes beyond the Re-
statement is represented in Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44
N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965). The plaintiff purchased new carpet for
his home; shortly thereafter the carpet developed "lines" or "runs."
In an action against the manufacturer for the purchase price, the
plaintiff prevailed on a theory of breach of implied warranty of
merchantability; however, the court said the action could have been
in strict tort liability. Most cases have not gone as far as Santor in
extending the strict tort theory. It is submitted that the Santor case
is the same as the television hypothetical where there was no physical
harm, but the set was a lemon.
42. NEB. UCC § 2-313.
43. The chief justice stated: "[P]ublic policy only demands an additional
remedy be given the buyer which eliminates situations beyond the
range of the Uniform Commercial Code and the applicable law of
sales." 190 Neb. at 562, 209 N.W.2d at 653 (emphasis added).
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allows recovery for consequential damages for breach of warranty.44
The same result is reached under section 402A.45 The crucial
distinction between the warranty provisions and strict tort lia-
bility is the ability under the Code to disclaim certain liabilities.
If the manufacturer excludes liability for personal injuries, it is
prima facie unconscionable under the Code, but he may disclaim
liability for injury to property.46 At this point, which of the two
alternative readings of Hawkins that eventually prevails becomes
extremely important. If the case is read to say that strict tort
liability does not include recovery for any property damage, a plain-
tiff is virtually left without a theory of recovery for injury to prop-
erty caused by a defective product. As the hypothetical illustrates,
there is nothing that could be recovered under such a restrictive
view of strict tort liability that could not be recovered under the
UCC. Instead of emasculating the provisions of the Code, as the
majority opinion feared,47 this reading of Hawkins would emascu-
late the doctrine of strict tort liability.
If Hawkins is read to allow recovery for damage to property
other than the defective product itself, the only remaining difficulty
is the distinction between "other property" and the defective prod-
uct. The majority opinion's reasoning was that economic loss
cases should be governed by warranty; and that damage to the de-
fective product itself constitutes economic loss. This is trouble-
some because damage to the defective product itself is not neces-
sarily limited to economic loss. If the defect in the product causes
actual physical harm to the product itself, as in the television hypo-
thetical, this is something other than economic loss. B's interest in
the benefit of the bargain is that his television work properly. But,
where the defect has reduced the product to a smoldering heap on
the family room floor, B's interests go beyond the scope of the bene-
fit of the bargain. His property has been destroyed. If he can re-
cover for a chair that burned when the television exploded, he
should recover for physical damage to the set itself.
This is the position of section 402A which Judge McCown
thoroughly analyzed in his dissenting opinion.48 Unlike Hawkins,
the Restatement does not distinguish between person and property
nor does it subdivide property damage claims into two categories. 49
44. See note 30 supra.
45. See note 4 supra.
46. See note 31 supra.
47. 190 Neb. at 562, 206 N.W.2d at 653.
48. Id. at 567, 209 N.W.2d at 656.
49. See note 4 supra.
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Conclusion
There is obviously no consensus among the members of the Ne-
braska Supreme Court as to the proper scope of strict tort liability.50
Perhaps, the court should have decided Hawkins on warranty
grounds and refrained from any further development of the strict
tort doctrine until necessary. Had the court been faced with a
case like the television hypothetical, where a warranty would not
provide a recovery for property damage, the court probably would
have provided a more definitive statement on strict tort liability.
Hawkins created confusion which can only be alleviated by a clear
and carefully considered opinion in the next appropriate case.
Further, it is urged that the majority reconsider Judge McCown's
dissenting opinion and adopt section 402A.
Steve Timm '75*
50. Six supreme court judges and one district court judge heard the Haw-
kins case. In addition to Chief Justice White's majority opinion,
Judges Smith and Clinton wrote concurring opinions. Judge McCown
concurred in part and dissented in part. Judge Boslaugh concurred
in the result only.
* Robert J. Banta assisted in the writing of this article.
